The more I have encountered libertarianism and all that that broadminded ideology embraces the more often I have needed to review and examine what underpins my own political philosophy. I find much solace in my growing certainty that nothing I hold to be true is founded on libertarianism but upholds it instead. It just goes to show that even if a man builds a stick hut on solid rock, it will last much longer than a mansion built on sand. In my position, however, I happen to have a mansion built upon a solid rock foundation.
In time, I hope to publish more thorough examinations of the libertarian sophistical system, but for the present, I wanted to put down a few thoughts on one fountainhead of modern liberalism (from which source individualism and libertarianism likewise grow), the "state of nature".
The "state of nature" supposedly is one in which man is removed from―existing prior to and without aid of―political society, i.e., government, law and pre-established social connections. While in some cases that isolation is complete, not every theory requires the abolition of all natural connections and bonds. As expounded here, for example, marriage and family contracts are not held to be under the penumbra of the political "social contract" in some cases. The theory is a thought experiment trying to discern what rights a man possesses before he opens political negotiations with his fellow man. Its aim is to discover the natural rights of man by giving him a political blank slate. In more extreme cases―Hobbes comes immediately to mind―it isolates him completely when man is demonstrably incapable of living an isolated life. It always amused me that mothers seemed to be no part of Hobbes' natural state: after all, what would every mother think of her child if he proved incapable of peaceful negotiation except wherein he needed to preserve his own life. It seems perfectly normal to assume that these men are, like Adam, created without mothers, but not created, unlike Adam, with an inherent need for friendship and community―even community with God. Perhaps Locke's state of nature more closely resembles reality than does that of Hobbes; however, a less-than-personal approach to God also distorts the natural need in man for communion.
It is no accident that Locke and other social contract theorists stumbled upon the fundamental rights of life, liberty and property which happen to coincide with three undeniable instincts an individual has to live, to choose the good and to possess things. It would have been more remarkable had Locke insisted that these three impulses did not constitute three such natural rights, as they had been recognized not only by the ancient rationalists, but also had been divinely sanctioned in the Old Testament ("Thou shalt not murder", "Thou shalt not steal", "Love thy neighbor as thyself"), reaffirmed by Christ during His ministry and maintained and defended by His Church for seventeen centuries. It could be argued instead that Locke chose those three natural rights because he could not escape the rational tradition of the West.
The search for natural rights is limited by those who chose to examine what man has in a state of nature rather than what man is by his own nature, to discover what a man does in pristine conditions rather than what a man is which manifests itself regardless of his circumstances. One can more accurately observe what a man is by how he acts in every circumstance than by how he acts in one protean situation. That man is endowed with certain natural rights should be evident through nature, not constructed by nature.
Friday, February 24, 2017
Friday, February 17, 2017
Railing on Trump's "Wall": Part IV
To my knowledge, this issue has not yet arisen, but as I have mentioned above, it may yet make an untimely appearance. The validity of Trump's powers in this regard (previously explained) notwithstanding, such advocates may argue that international law safeguards a "right to immigrate" and a "right to asylum" which Trump now has abrogated.
"The world must construe according to its wits; this Court must construe according to the law."
~Thomas More: A Man for All Seasons
The Supreme Court has increasingly appealed to international law as a measure to judge the legality and even the morality of legislation challenged under the authority of Constitutional law. This disingenuous and necessarily disastrous juris-imprudence clearly reveals a bias in favour of international law, as if the will of Europe's governments were of more consequence to American law than either the will of the American people or even the "Laws of Nature and of Nature's God" upon which this Constitution is rightly founded. Dr. Edwin Vieira, Jr., guts the internationalist practices and biases which the Supreme Court has gradually adopted in his excellent book How to Dethrone the Imperial Judiciary.
A more reasonable critic could rightly claim that international treaties may influence the legality of the President's executive order. Article VI of the Constitution states that "all Treaties made...under the Authority of the United States, shall be [part of] the supreme Law of the Land[,]" and the United States has subscribed to both the Geneva Convention and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. One question must be entertained here: does the Treaty or any part of it violate the Constitution or require any sworn official to disregard his essential duties to "preserve, protect and defend" this Constitution? If the answer were affirmative, then the offending part of the treaty―possibly even the treaty in total―would be null and void without needing further declaration.
If the treaty is entirely legitimate, then one might further ask what the parameters of these international protections might be? How specific are they? How are they worded?
Marine le Pen, a front runner in France's current Presidential race and Member of the European Parliament, deftly answers this query. I need not add anything to her statements here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Sfhc_e5P88 (beginning at 8:30). The strict terms apply to all emigres and to every subscribing nation.
If it comes down to it, Trump's best response would be to imitate the mighty Andrew Jackson and ignore the ruling of the Court. The law, if it stands acquitted by a common-sense reading of the Constitution, must continue to stand, especially if the Justices rule that it should fall because they prefer to stand by vapid international standards which justify their position, rather than uphold the Constitution.A more reasonable critic could rightly claim that international treaties may influence the legality of the President's executive order. Article VI of the Constitution states that "all Treaties made...under the Authority of the United States, shall be [part of] the supreme Law of the Land[,]" and the United States has subscribed to both the Geneva Convention and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. One question must be entertained here: does the Treaty or any part of it violate the Constitution or require any sworn official to disregard his essential duties to "preserve, protect and defend" this Constitution? If the answer were affirmative, then the offending part of the treaty―possibly even the treaty in total―would be null and void without needing further declaration.
If the treaty is entirely legitimate, then one might further ask what the parameters of these international protections might be? How specific are they? How are they worded?
Marine le Pen, a front runner in France's current Presidential race and Member of the European Parliament, deftly answers this query. I need not add anything to her statements here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Sfhc_e5P88 (beginning at 8:30). The strict terms apply to all emigres and to every subscribing nation.
"The world must construe according to its wits; this Court must construe according to the law."
~Thomas More: A Man for All Seasons
Saturday, February 11, 2017
Railing on Trump's "Wall": Part III
"The best laid schemes o' mice and men
Gang aft a-gley. ~ Robert Burns
It appears that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the District Court in Washington State to halt enforcement of President Trump's executive order until it has been reviewed and deemed lawful.
Following the arguments of the plaintiffs, the Court dismembers the executive order remotely, preferring again to relate immaterial motifs that depend more on conjecture than on what the Executive Order stipulates: it prefers the interests of non-immigrant and immigrant visa holders to those of citizens, it prefers the interest of private institutions to the public welfare, and it prefers the arguable interests of the States to the explicit rights and duties of the Federal Government. It also prefers to reserve judgment on the Constitutional issue relating to the Establishment Clause, not because the accusation is groundless both in fact and in law, but "in light of the sensitive interests involved", whatever that means.
All this while it continues to ignore the material claims of the relevant statutory law.
Such an oversight is striking particularly in Section VI of the appeal decision which reviews the Government's likelihood of success in countering the State's due process claims. Not once is 8 U.S.C. 1182 (f) mentioned in connection with the duty to provide due process, nor is it regarded as an integral part of due process. And since the President has the authority and the duty to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed", a statute which provides immediate and effective power to the President to halt all immigration or any part of it that he deems in the national interest at any time and for any period of time would seem to be sanctioned by his constitutional authority. (One may even argue that the Executive authority in 1182 (f) is especially intended for national emergencies, when due process may be altered according to the demands of the general welfare.) Nor does it regard the statutory right of the President to stop immigrants from entering the United States in any way relevant; it focuses instead on aliens who are already on this soil. It challenges the Executive's authority to enforce this Order upon aliens immediately and without notice or chance of reply as a violation of due process. It should be noted that the Order does not in any way require the deportation of undesired aliens, immediately or otherwise. It merely suspends their entry for ninety days, which provides them ample time to appeal their cases, and does not recommend any further action until the period of review and report has been completed.
And of course, pace this great authority, "due process" does not mean that undocumented aliens cannot be deported. It means merely that the government authority must have proof of an alien's undocumented status in order to enforce upon them compliance with national immigration laws. Illegal aliens are de facto and de jure criminals. Proof of illegal entry demands deportation. End of story.
As it is, I am still primarily concerned that this case will make its way to the Supreme Court, and that that august body will decide against the statutory power of 8 U.S.C. 1182 (f) without once considering it on its own constitutional merits. And that will be the end of border control, of defense against multi-cultural invasion and, in the end, the last nail in the coffin of the sovereignty of the United States.
Gang aft a-gley. ~ Robert Burns
It appears that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the District Court in Washington State to halt enforcement of President Trump's executive order until it has been reviewed and deemed lawful.
Following the arguments of the plaintiffs, the Court dismembers the executive order remotely, preferring again to relate immaterial motifs that depend more on conjecture than on what the Executive Order stipulates: it prefers the interests of non-immigrant and immigrant visa holders to those of citizens, it prefers the interest of private institutions to the public welfare, and it prefers the arguable interests of the States to the explicit rights and duties of the Federal Government. It also prefers to reserve judgment on the Constitutional issue relating to the Establishment Clause, not because the accusation is groundless both in fact and in law, but "in light of the sensitive interests involved", whatever that means.
All this while it continues to ignore the material claims of the relevant statutory law.
Such an oversight is striking particularly in Section VI of the appeal decision which reviews the Government's likelihood of success in countering the State's due process claims. Not once is 8 U.S.C. 1182 (f) mentioned in connection with the duty to provide due process, nor is it regarded as an integral part of due process. And since the President has the authority and the duty to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed", a statute which provides immediate and effective power to the President to halt all immigration or any part of it that he deems in the national interest at any time and for any period of time would seem to be sanctioned by his constitutional authority. (One may even argue that the Executive authority in 1182 (f) is especially intended for national emergencies, when due process may be altered according to the demands of the general welfare.) Nor does it regard the statutory right of the President to stop immigrants from entering the United States in any way relevant; it focuses instead on aliens who are already on this soil. It challenges the Executive's authority to enforce this Order upon aliens immediately and without notice or chance of reply as a violation of due process. It should be noted that the Order does not in any way require the deportation of undesired aliens, immediately or otherwise. It merely suspends their entry for ninety days, which provides them ample time to appeal their cases, and does not recommend any further action until the period of review and report has been completed.
And of course, pace this great authority, "due process" does not mean that undocumented aliens cannot be deported. It means merely that the government authority must have proof of an alien's undocumented status in order to enforce upon them compliance with national immigration laws. Illegal aliens are de facto and de jure criminals. Proof of illegal entry demands deportation. End of story.
As it is, I am still primarily concerned that this case will make its way to the Supreme Court, and that that august body will decide against the statutory power of 8 U.S.C. 1182 (f) without once considering it on its own constitutional merits. And that will be the end of border control, of defense against multi-cultural invasion and, in the end, the last nail in the coffin of the sovereignty of the United States.
Tuesday, February 7, 2017
Railing on Trump's "Wall": Part II
Word is spreading.
Fifteen states and the District of Columbia under the signed names of their attorneys general (allegedly supported by this familiar face) have filed an amicus brief alongside Washington and Minnesota's federal lawsuit contesting Donald Trump's Executive Order. The original lawsuit has been upheld in one Washington court and denied in one Massachusetts court. (This opinion piece compares the conduct of the two cases well).
In summary, the Washington court judge enjoined a temporary restraining order against Trump's Executive Order without any argument based on the relevant statutes. Massachusetts' court did consider the ramifications of statutory law and executive-legislative prerogative in this matter and decided against a temporary restraint.
So naturally, the former judge's brief relies on some rather stunning legal gymnastics.
The first three observations do not offer any valid objections to the order or support the legal cause against it. If they serve any purpose, it is as red herrings and sob stories aimed at reducing what should be a legal issue to an emotional appeal.
The latter two objections raise the central problems projected by these states, claiming that the order violates the Establishment Clause and inflicts "irreparable harm" on the amici states and further arrogates their legal prerogatives.
However, the amici in the case are not so circumspect as to provide evidence of the violation. They claim a priori that a violation has occurred and argue instead that the alleged violation inflicts irreparable harm on them. Nonetheless, the argument could only take a few directions and maintain any validity.
The Establishment Clause uses very precise language regarding the relationship between the federal government and religion: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof[.]" What does it mean to "establish[]" a religion? At the time, Colonists knew of only one established religion, the Anglican Church, which received tax revenue from Parliament and was under the control of the political head of the nation, the king. The Continental Congress realized that such a union of religion and state policy would have disastrous consequences not unlike the persecutions and wars that ravaged England barely a century earlier; so, they cut all ties between the state and an officially funded, politically managed religion.
More recently, however, "establishment" has been colloquially reinterpreted as "endorsement" or "preference", and bans on praying in public schools and bible reading for example have swiftly followed with "protected" satanic clubs hard on their heels. A much vaguer term, "endorsement" allows for a broader swath of contrary actions such as simultaneously demand protection of Muslims and disenfranchisement of Christians.
Accepting that the advocates of this lawsuit have no claim that Trump has "established" a religion in the strict (and therefore only proper) sense, one must assume that they instead claim he has in some way "endorsed" one religion over another. Several relevant paragraphs of the order are referenced as proof of the order's anti-Muslim bent:
1) Sec. 1, par. 3 refers to "hostile attitudes" and "violent ideologies" that should not be allowed to enter into the United States. It further references "honor killings" and other rights violations that should not be countenanced;
2) Sec. 5(b) directs the Secretary of State to "prioritize refugee claims made by individuals on the basis of religious-based persecution, provided that the religion of the individual is a minority religion in the individual's country of nationality". Of course, in the seven targeted countries, Islam is the majority religion;
3) Sec. 5(c) specifically denies entry to Syrian refugees "until such time as...sufficient changes have been made...to ensure that admission...is consistent with the national interest[]"; and
4) Sec 5(d) restricts the entry numbers of refugees in general to 50,000 until such entries are deemed in accord with the "national interest."
Now unless the litigants want to argue that Islam is the only religion with "hostile attitudes" and "violent ideologies", that it is the only religion that could ever endorse "honor killings" and other rights violations, that Christians and other non-Islamic religions are not being actively targeted in Islamic countries and that Syria is not an active war zone endangered by the Islamic fundamentalists known as ISIS, they have no grounds to suppose that the order singles out Muslims for scrutiny because of their religious beliefs.
If, on the other hand, as presented in another amicus brief filed by law professors across the nation, the executive order violates 8 U.S.C. 1152 (a)1(A) which forbids preference or discrimination based on "race, sex, nationality, place of birth or place of residence", then it remains to be seen what is illegal about preference or discrimination based solely upon religion or political persecution. This becomes even more problematic if, as this brief claims, 8 U.S.C. 1152 (a)1(A) supersedes the presidential prerogative provided in 8 U.S.C. 1182 (f) [see pg. 10-11 (35-36/62)] as Trump would have been restricted by law to consider religion or political affiliation as the only legal bases upon which to enforce his immigration ban. A Muslim ban it should have been then!
Why assume that 8 U.S.C. 1152 (a)1(A) supersedes 8 U.S.C. 1182 (f)? Why assume that because a statute was passed after another related statute that the latter repeals the former or even amends it? Statutory laws are repealed, revised or amended specifically by other statutes, or they are proven to be at variance with the Constitution through judicial review. 8 U.S.C. 1152 (a)1(A) makes no mention of 8 U.S.C. 1182 (f) and as such leaves the preceding powers intact. The broad language of 8 U.S.C. 1182 (f) is not used by accident; it implies high levels of power and discretion in the President's hands and his alone. To limit the preference or discrimination in one place while leaving intact the power to discriminate against "all alien or any class of alien" flies in the face of reason.
Even the brief filed by the "Constitutional scholars" cannot avoid the fact that "every President over the last 30 years has issued at least one Executive Order pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1182 (f) and that many of those order excluded aliens on the basis of nationality"; however, these scholars attempt to justify their objection by observing that those orders were "not categorical exclusions of broad classes deemed to pose a risk" but restricted "individuals that had engaged in culpable conduct". [See pg. 6 (12/25)]
False. False. False.
Honestly, the Left should be ashamed of their own proponents and their own arguments. They play the Constitution as if it were a chip in their game, when they could make far more headway by openly disowning the Constitution instead. Perhaps they have not noticed that those who take hard stances on the core issues have more clout than those that take coy stances on the hard issues.
What is next? Will a court expound the illegality of Trump's order based on a survey of international law and practices and opinions of the international community? Before they attempt it, I shall provide arguments against such juris-impudence in the next installment.
Fifteen states and the District of Columbia under the signed names of their attorneys general (allegedly supported by this familiar face) have filed an amicus brief alongside Washington and Minnesota's federal lawsuit contesting Donald Trump's Executive Order. The original lawsuit has been upheld in one Washington court and denied in one Massachusetts court. (This opinion piece compares the conduct of the two cases well).
In summary, the Washington court judge enjoined a temporary restraining order against Trump's Executive Order without any argument based on the relevant statutes. Massachusetts' court did consider the ramifications of statutory law and executive-legislative prerogative in this matter and decided against a temporary restraint.
So naturally, the former judge's brief relies on some rather stunning legal gymnastics.
The first three observations do not offer any valid objections to the order or support the legal cause against it. If they serve any purpose, it is as red herrings and sob stories aimed at reducing what should be a legal issue to an emotional appeal.
The latter two objections raise the central problems projected by these states, claiming that the order violates the Establishment Clause and inflicts "irreparable harm" on the amici states and further arrogates their legal prerogatives.
However, the amici in the case are not so circumspect as to provide evidence of the violation. They claim a priori that a violation has occurred and argue instead that the alleged violation inflicts irreparable harm on them. Nonetheless, the argument could only take a few directions and maintain any validity.
The Establishment Clause uses very precise language regarding the relationship between the federal government and religion: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof[.]" What does it mean to "establish[]" a religion? At the time, Colonists knew of only one established religion, the Anglican Church, which received tax revenue from Parliament and was under the control of the political head of the nation, the king. The Continental Congress realized that such a union of religion and state policy would have disastrous consequences not unlike the persecutions and wars that ravaged England barely a century earlier; so, they cut all ties between the state and an officially funded, politically managed religion.
More recently, however, "establishment" has been colloquially reinterpreted as "endorsement" or "preference", and bans on praying in public schools and bible reading for example have swiftly followed with "protected" satanic clubs hard on their heels. A much vaguer term, "endorsement" allows for a broader swath of contrary actions such as simultaneously demand protection of Muslims and disenfranchisement of Christians.
Accepting that the advocates of this lawsuit have no claim that Trump has "established" a religion in the strict (and therefore only proper) sense, one must assume that they instead claim he has in some way "endorsed" one religion over another. Several relevant paragraphs of the order are referenced as proof of the order's anti-Muslim bent:
1) Sec. 1, par. 3 refers to "hostile attitudes" and "violent ideologies" that should not be allowed to enter into the United States. It further references "honor killings" and other rights violations that should not be countenanced;
2) Sec. 5(b) directs the Secretary of State to "prioritize refugee claims made by individuals on the basis of religious-based persecution, provided that the religion of the individual is a minority religion in the individual's country of nationality". Of course, in the seven targeted countries, Islam is the majority religion;
3) Sec. 5(c) specifically denies entry to Syrian refugees "until such time as...sufficient changes have been made...to ensure that admission...is consistent with the national interest[]"; and
4) Sec 5(d) restricts the entry numbers of refugees in general to 50,000 until such entries are deemed in accord with the "national interest."
Now unless the litigants want to argue that Islam is the only religion with "hostile attitudes" and "violent ideologies", that it is the only religion that could ever endorse "honor killings" and other rights violations, that Christians and other non-Islamic religions are not being actively targeted in Islamic countries and that Syria is not an active war zone endangered by the Islamic fundamentalists known as ISIS, they have no grounds to suppose that the order singles out Muslims for scrutiny because of their religious beliefs.
If, on the other hand, as presented in another amicus brief filed by law professors across the nation, the executive order violates 8 U.S.C. 1152 (a)1(A) which forbids preference or discrimination based on "race, sex, nationality, place of birth or place of residence", then it remains to be seen what is illegal about preference or discrimination based solely upon religion or political persecution. This becomes even more problematic if, as this brief claims, 8 U.S.C. 1152 (a)1(A) supersedes the presidential prerogative provided in 8 U.S.C. 1182 (f) [see pg. 10-11 (35-36/62)] as Trump would have been restricted by law to consider religion or political affiliation as the only legal bases upon which to enforce his immigration ban. A Muslim ban it should have been then!
Why assume that 8 U.S.C. 1152 (a)1(A) supersedes 8 U.S.C. 1182 (f)? Why assume that because a statute was passed after another related statute that the latter repeals the former or even amends it? Statutory laws are repealed, revised or amended specifically by other statutes, or they are proven to be at variance with the Constitution through judicial review. 8 U.S.C. 1152 (a)1(A) makes no mention of 8 U.S.C. 1182 (f) and as such leaves the preceding powers intact. The broad language of 8 U.S.C. 1182 (f) is not used by accident; it implies high levels of power and discretion in the President's hands and his alone. To limit the preference or discrimination in one place while leaving intact the power to discriminate against "all alien or any class of alien" flies in the face of reason.
Even the brief filed by the "Constitutional scholars" cannot avoid the fact that "every President over the last 30 years has issued at least one Executive Order pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1182 (f) and that many of those order excluded aliens on the basis of nationality"; however, these scholars attempt to justify their objection by observing that those orders were "not categorical exclusions of broad classes deemed to pose a risk" but restricted "individuals that had engaged in culpable conduct". [See pg. 6 (12/25)]
False. False. False.
Honestly, the Left should be ashamed of their own proponents and their own arguments. They play the Constitution as if it were a chip in their game, when they could make far more headway by openly disowning the Constitution instead. Perhaps they have not noticed that those who take hard stances on the core issues have more clout than those that take coy stances on the hard issues.
What is next? Will a court expound the illegality of Trump's order based on a survey of international law and practices and opinions of the international community? Before they attempt it, I shall provide arguments against such juris-impudence in the next installment.
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