Dear Reader, Shortly before Christmas, I again had the privilege of reading and critiquing an article by Dominic Cassella published on his website. He wrote on the intriguing matter of Involuntary Sin (http://thecatholicdormitory.wordpress.com/2013/12/13/involuntary-sin-ohhh/), to which I wrote the body of this article in reply. While I have modified some areas in their phrasing, the formal thrust remains unaltered. Dominic, Very interesting article. Even though it is obviously the fruit of
much research, some direct citation, especially from the Liturgy of
St. John Chrysostom, would have been most welcome. I believe you are correct in stating that this teaching on
involuntary sin does not contradict the Catechism and its doctrine of
Venial sin (or sin in general); however, I think it presents, at worst, a
contrary position, at best, an alternative one, both of which I find
lack some grain of the truth. If we accept that [CCC 1849] “Sin is an offense against reason,
truth, and right conscience; it is failure in genuine love for God and
neighbor caused by a perverse attachment to certain goods. It wounds the
nature of man and injures human solidarity. It has been defined as ‘an
utterance, a deed, or a desire contrary to the eternal law’,” then there
are certain things which follow: First, that sin is an act or omission motivated by self-interest against reality—as it is, and is perceived; Second, that it is an act contrary to the moral [eternal] law, not Divine Providence; and Third, that culpability for sin depends on the state of conscience and the ordering of one’s reason towards the truth. The second and third points need more explanation. God has taken all sin into account through His Providence. In one
sense, saying that an act (good or bad) is outside of God’s plan means
God has not provided for that action whatsoever, and needs to adjust His
plan; in another sense, it could simply mean that God desired us to
act differently, but has nonetheless provided for our failure. In other
words: His desire is specifically different from His Providence. (I
believe the latter states the understanding in question, though I could
be mistaken.) But such cannot be the case; God’s desire for us and His
Providential plan are inseparable. He longs to bring all men to Himself
and has provided such means to it as the author of the Economy of
Grace. [CCC 321] “Divine providence consists of the dispositions by
which God guides all his creatures with wisdom and love to their
ultimate end.” He will not make sin where there is none to be found. This is the crucial point: God will not hold us culpable for
things of which we have no knowledge and over which we can exert no
control. He will not put us into an environment such that we cannot
escape sin. The argument for involuntary sin fails to take the human
conscience into account; and the eternal law which sin inevitably breaks
is inscribed on the hearts of all men. It is impossible to sin and to
keep this eternal law intact. Invincible ignorance of an evil removes all culpability for the
sin. "Ah, culpability," you say, "But what of the act itself? Is this not the
heart of the matter: that a sin has been committed, even though there is
no punishment due to the actor? The act can clearly be labeled a sin, and since it is performed, is not a sin committed?" In the first place, act and action are separate things. They are often distinguished as "Act" from "Behavior," in which a "Behavior" is an action considered apart from both circumstance and intention, and an "Act" is considered only in conjunction with both. (For example, walking to the mailbox is a "Behavior"; my walking to the mailbox to pick up my own mail is an "Act"). Intention is necessary to sin.
Even in sins of omission, there exists the intention to not do something
which by all accounts (of reason, right conscience, and reality) ought to be done. Right conscience plays a heavy role in forming
intention; it judges reason, which judges reality and forms our
perception of things as they are. In the second place, we must consider the consequence: if there can be sin without culpability, can
there be culpability without sin? Can there be guilt without something of
which to be guilty? (Let us set aside, momentarily, the question of a scrupulous conscience, which can lead itself to sin through exorbitant manifestations of guilt). Sin cannot but result in culpability for personal action, and personal culpability is a necessary part of the calculus of sin. And in the third place, certain actions are morally wrong
regardless of good intention, and as such, clearly forbidden by the
eternal law (written on the conscience, remember). Morally good actions
done with bad intention are made bad, regardless of their existential
goodness; and morally neutral acts are made good or bad by the
intention of the actor and his circumstances. As we see, all acts themselves not morally evil hinge
on the intention of the actor, which is largely formed by the actions of his conscience. I couldn’t state it any clearer than this: [quoted in CCC 1778] ”
[Conscience] is a messenger of him, who, both in nature and in grace,
speaks to us behind a veil, and teaches and rules us by his
representatives. Conscience is the aboriginal Vicar of Christ.” Of course, the Church has come to understand moral precepts far
more delicate than those found in the natural law; however, these are
not found in the hearts of men, and one’s conscience must be informed of
these precepts from another authority. Where conscience is not informed through no fault of the actor there can be no sin. To take the classic example: an aboriginal tribe that practiced ritual fornication is
indeed culpable, but only for what they knew in their consciences to be
against the natural law which is inscribed on the hearts of all men as a
guide to Truth. They could not be guilty of not going to Mass on
Sunday because they had never heard of Mass, nor could they be held
responsible for not accepting the homoousios. They will be judged
purely on what they knew in their hearts, and how they either obeyed, or
disrespected the laws of their consciences. God sees things as God; we see them as men. “Truth is truth to the
end of measure,” and God cannot judge us as He would judge Himself.
Knowing our inmost hearts, he alone is capable of judging us as men, and
judging our response to our knowledge of the Truth. [I beg all those who have read this article to extend their generosity toward Mr. Cassella and consider his opinion as magnanimously as they have mine.]
Shortly before Christmas, I again had the privilege of reading and critiquing an article by Dominic Cassella published on his website. He wrote on the intriguing matter of Involuntary Sin (http://thecatholicdormitory.wordpress.com/2013/12/13/involuntary-sin-ohhh/), to which I wrote the body of this article in reply. While I have modified some areas in their phrasing, the formal thrust remains unaltered.
Dominic,
Very interesting article. Even though it is obviously the fruit of much research, some direct citation, especially from the Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom, would have been most welcome.
I believe you are correct in stating that this teaching on involuntary sin does not contradict the Catechism and its doctrine of Venial sin (or sin in general); however, I think it presents, at worst, a contrary position, at best, an alternative one, both of which I find lack some grain of the truth.
If we accept that [CCC 1849] “Sin is an offense against reason, truth, and right conscience; it is failure in genuine love for God and neighbor caused by a perverse attachment to certain goods. It wounds the nature of man and injures human solidarity. It has been defined as ‘an utterance, a deed, or a desire contrary to the eternal law’,” then there are certain things which follow:
First, that sin is an act or omission motivated by self-interest against reality—as it is, and is perceived;
Second, that it is an act contrary to the moral [eternal] law, not Divine Providence; and
Third, that culpability for sin depends on the state of conscience and the ordering of one’s reason towards the truth.
The second and third points need more explanation.
God has taken all sin into account through His Providence. In one sense, saying that an act (good or bad) is outside of God’s plan means God has not provided for that action whatsoever, and needs to adjust His plan; in another sense, it could simply mean that God desired us to act differently, but has nonetheless provided for our failure. In other words: His desire is specifically different from His Providence. (I believe the latter states the understanding in question, though I could be mistaken.) But such cannot be the case; God’s desire for us and His Providential plan are inseparable. He longs to bring all men to Himself and has provided such means to it as the author of the Economy of Grace. [CCC 321] “Divine providence consists of the dispositions by which God guides all his creatures with wisdom and love to their ultimate end.” He will not make sin where there is none to be found.
This is the crucial point: God will not hold us culpable for things of which we have no knowledge and over which we can exert no control. He will not put us into an environment such that we cannot escape sin. The argument for involuntary sin fails to take the human conscience into account; and the eternal law which sin inevitably breaks is inscribed on the hearts of all men. It is impossible to sin and to keep this eternal law intact. Invincible ignorance of an evil removes all culpability for the sin.
"Ah, culpability," you say, "But what of the act itself? Is this not the heart of the matter: that a sin has been committed, even though there is no punishment due to the actor? The act can clearly be labeled a sin, and since it is performed, is not a sin committed?"
In the first place, act and action are separate things. They are often distinguished as "Act" from "Behavior," in which a "Behavior" is an action considered apart from both circumstance and intention, and an "Act" is considered only in conjunction with both. (For example, walking to the mailbox is a "Behavior"; my walking to the mailbox to pick up my own mail is an "Act"). Intention is necessary to sin. Even in sins of omission, there exists the intention to not do something which by all accounts (of reason, right conscience, and reality) ought to be done. Right conscience plays a heavy role in forming intention; it judges reason, which judges reality and forms our perception of things as they are.
In the second place, we must consider the consequence: if there can be sin without culpability, can there be culpability without sin? Can there be guilt without something of which to be guilty? (Let us set aside, momentarily, the question of a scrupulous conscience, which can lead itself to sin through exorbitant manifestations of guilt). Sin cannot but result in culpability for personal action, and personal culpability is a necessary part of the calculus of sin.
And in the third place, certain actions are morally wrong regardless of good intention, and as such, clearly forbidden by the eternal law (written on the conscience, remember). Morally good actions done with bad intention are made bad, regardless of their existential goodness; and morally neutral acts are made good or bad by the intention of the actor and his circumstances. As we see, all acts themselves not morally evil hinge on the intention of the actor, which is largely formed by the actions of his conscience.
I couldn’t state it any clearer than this: [quoted in CCC 1778] ” [Conscience] is a messenger of him, who, both in nature and in grace, speaks to us behind a veil, and teaches and rules us by his representatives. Conscience is the aboriginal Vicar of Christ.”
Of course, the Church has come to understand moral precepts far more delicate than those found in the natural law; however, these are not found in the hearts of men, and one’s conscience must be informed of these precepts from another authority. Where conscience is not informed through no fault of the actor there can be no sin.
To take the classic example: an aboriginal tribe that practiced ritual fornication is indeed culpable, but only for what they knew in their consciences to be against the natural law which is inscribed on the hearts of all men as a guide to Truth. They could not be guilty of not going to Mass on Sunday because they had never heard of Mass, nor could they be held responsible for not accepting the homoousios. They will be judged purely on what they knew in their hearts, and how they either obeyed, or disrespected the laws of their consciences.
God sees things as God; we see them as men. “Truth is truth to the end of measure,” and God cannot judge us as He would judge Himself. Knowing our inmost hearts, he alone is capable of judging us as men, and judging our response to our knowledge of the Truth.
[I beg all those who have read this article to extend their generosity toward Mr. Cassella and consider his opinion as magnanimously as they have mine.]