http://www.patheos.com/blogs/badcatholic/2013/02/im-with-them-the-female-paradox-of-praying-at-planned-parenthood.html
"A common refrain from pro-choice advocates against the pro-life movement is that those who are pro-life simply do not understand the earth-shattering reality of an unplanned pregnancy. In order to speak about abortion, one must have some experiential knowledge of the tragedy or at least the potential for the experience. Without this understanding you are automatically disqualified from the conversation."
"With this line of reasoning, men who pray in front of these clinics are easy to dismiss. Their Y chromosome renders them incapable of understanding the hopelessness of an unplanned pregnancy. Therefore, their opinions on the subject do not matter and their presence outside the clinic is laughable at best and insulting at worst."
Why does this collective conscience ignore the arguments presented by women who regret their abortions? The common refrain seems to be "Your choice, your pain." Planned Parenthood does not aim at the good of all women. They do not protect their own. They do not listen to them; they do not heal them. Their "rebellious" children―that is, women who regret their abortions―are not counselled, or loved for who they are; instead, they are ignored, ostracized and placed with the ignorant rustics who stand outside abortion clinics wailing and gnashing their teeth.
Men cannot be unrelated to the equation. What woman ever contracted an "unplanned pregnancy" (or any kind of pregnancy save a pregnant thought) from something other than a man? Why does Planned Parenthood encourage men to support women who want abortions, if it simultaneously ignores men's encouragement to do the opposite? Either they have a say, or they have none. Planned Parenthood cannot have it both ways.
Furthermore, men do understand the hopelessness of an unplanned pregnancy; otherwise, they would never counsel for or against an abortion. They would be indifferent on such matters. That, of course, is the image Planned Parenthood wants to paint of the generic male: that he is callous, self-centered, and uninterested in the after-effects of a night in bed. However, the number of male influences both inside and outside of abortion clinics speaks against the very heart of this image. How often does a young girl solicit an abortion because her father might find out she is pregnant? How often does a woman seek it out because her husband did not want to keep an "unplanned" baby? How much more often because a girl's fiance or boyfriend thought it would erase their mistake? How often does the man "force" the woman to an abortion simply because "this was her problem"? How many "doctors" care for their "patients" out of a mistaken solicitude for their "well-being".
In a negative way, this shows how important a man is to this issue. On the flip side, how often does a woman rely on the man in the equation to help her through the difficult trial she faces? If he stands by her (and, incidentally, the baby), how much more likely is she to birth her child?
If the man excuses himself from his responsibility, then only a determined woman could keep from shirking her part of the natural "bargain." The converse is also true: if the woman wishes to escape, then only a compassionate man could possibly persuade her to spare the baby.
Either way, man is essential; he has a definite stake in the question. Then it should not be improper to suggest that he should have a say in the matter. He should listen and be listened to.
Shortly before Christmas, I again had the privilege of reading and critiquing an article by Dominic Cassella published on his website. He wrote on the intriguing matter of Involuntary Sin (http://thecatholicdormitory.wordpress.com/2013/12/13/involuntary-sin-ohhh/), to which I wrote the body of this article in reply. While I have modified some areas in their phrasing, the formal thrust remains unaltered.
Dominic,
Very interesting article. Even though it is obviously the fruit of much research, some direct citation, especially from the Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom, would have been most welcome.
I believe you are correct in stating that this teaching on involuntary sin does not contradict the Catechism and its doctrine of Venial sin (or sin in general); however, I think it presents, at worst, a contrary position, at best, an alternative one, both of which I find lack some grain of the truth.
If we accept that [CCC 1849] “Sin is an offense against reason, truth, and right conscience; it is failure in genuine love for God and neighbor caused by a perverse attachment to certain goods. It wounds the nature of man and injures human solidarity. It has been defined as ‘an utterance, a deed, or a desire contrary to the eternal law’,” then there are certain things which follow:
First, that sin is an act or omission motivated by self-interest against reality—as it is, and is perceived;
Second, that it is an act contrary to the moral [eternal] law, not Divine Providence; and
Third, that culpability for sin depends on the state of conscience and the ordering of one’s reason towards the truth.
The second and third points need more explanation.
God has taken all sin into account through His Providence. In one sense, saying that an act (good or bad) is outside of God’s plan means God has not provided for that action whatsoever, and needs to adjust His plan; in another sense, it could simply mean that God desired us to act differently, but has nonetheless provided for our failure. In other words: His desire is specifically different from His Providence. (I believe the latter states the understanding in question, though I could be mistaken.) But such cannot be the case; God’s desire for us and His Providential plan are inseparable. He longs to bring all men to Himself and has provided such means to it as the author of the Economy of Grace. [CCC 321] “Divine providence consists of the dispositions by which God guides all his creatures with wisdom and love to their ultimate end.” He will not make sin where there is none to be found.
This is the crucial point: God will not hold us culpable for things of which we have no knowledge and over which we can exert no control. He will not put us into an environment such that we cannot escape sin. The argument for involuntary sin fails to take the human conscience into account; and the eternal law which sin inevitably breaks is inscribed on the hearts of all men. It is impossible to sin and to keep this eternal law intact. Invincible ignorance of an evil removes all culpability for the sin.
"Ah, culpability," you say, "But what of the act itself? Is this not the heart of the matter: that a sin has been committed, even though there is no punishment due to the actor? The act can clearly be labeled a sin, and since it is performed, is not a sin committed?"
In the first place, act and action are separate things. They are often distinguished as "Act" from "Behavior," in which a "Behavior" is an action considered apart from both circumstance and intention, and an "Act" is considered only in conjunction with both. (For example, walking to the mailbox is a "Behavior"; my walking to the mailbox to pick up my own mail is an "Act"). Intention is necessary to sin. Even in sins of omission, there exists the intention to not do something which by all accounts (of reason, right conscience, and reality) ought to be done. Right conscience plays a heavy role in forming intention; it judges reason, which judges reality and forms our perception of things as they are.
In the second place, we must consider the consequence: if there can be sin without culpability, can there be culpability without sin? Can there be guilt without something of which to be guilty? (Let us set aside, momentarily, the question of a scrupulous conscience, which can lead itself to sin through exorbitant manifestations of guilt). Sin cannot but result in culpability for personal action, and personal culpability is a necessary part of the calculus of sin.
And in the third place, certain actions are morally wrong regardless of good intention, and as such, clearly forbidden by the eternal law (written on the conscience, remember). Morally good actions done with bad intention are made bad, regardless of their existential goodness; and morally neutral acts are made good or bad by the intention of the actor and his circumstances. As we see, all acts themselves not morally evil hinge on the intention of the actor, which is largely formed by the actions of his conscience.
I couldn’t state it any clearer than this: [quoted in CCC 1778] ” [Conscience] is a messenger of him, who, both in nature and in grace, speaks to us behind a veil, and teaches and rules us by his representatives. Conscience is the aboriginal Vicar of Christ.”
Of course, the Church has come to understand moral precepts far more delicate than those found in the natural law; however, these are not found in the hearts of men, and one’s conscience must be informed of these precepts from another authority. Where conscience is not informed through no fault of the actor there can be no sin.
To take the classic example: an aboriginal tribe that practiced ritual fornication is indeed culpable, but only for what they knew in their consciences to be against the natural law which is inscribed on the hearts of all men as a guide to Truth. They could not be guilty of not going to Mass on Sunday because they had never heard of Mass, nor could they be held responsible for not accepting the homoousios. They will be judged purely on what they knew in their hearts, and how they either obeyed, or disrespected the laws of their consciences.
God sees things as God; we see them as men. “Truth is truth to the end of measure,” and God cannot judge us as He would judge Himself. Knowing our inmost hearts, he alone is capable of judging us as men, and judging our response to our knowledge of the Truth.
[I beg all those who have read this article to extend their generosity toward Mr. Cassella and consider his opinion as magnanimously as they have mine.]